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Detailed Minutes of Soldier Life.

By Private CARLTON MCCARTHY.

PAPER No. 4—*Cooking and Eating.*

[Many of our readers will be glad to see another of those vivid sketches of soldier life from the pen of Private McCarthy, whose previous sketches were so widely read and commended.]

Rations in the Army of Northern Virginia were alternately superabundant and altogether wanting. The quality, quantity and frequency of them depended upon the amount of stores in the hands of the commissaries, the relative positions of the troops and the wagon trains, and the many accidents and mishaps of the campaign. During the latter years and months of the war, so uncertain was the issue as to time, quantity and composition, the men became in large measure independent of this seeming absolute necessity, and by some mysterious means, known only to purely patriotic soldiers, learned to fight without pay and find a subsistence in the field, the stream or the forest, and, on the bleak mountain side, a shelter.

Sometimes there was an abundant issue of bread and no meat; then meat in any quantity and no flour or meal. Sugar in abundance and no coffee to be had for "love or money," and then coffee plentifully without a grain of sugar. For months nothing but flour for bread and then nothing but meal, till all hands longed for a biscuit, or fresh meat until it was nauseating; and then salt-pork without intermission.

To be one day without anything to eat was common. Two days fasting, marching and fighting was not uncommon, and there were times when no rations were issued for three or four days. On one march, from Petersburg to Appomattox, no rations were issued to Cutshaw's battalion of artillery for one entire week, and the men subsisted on the corn intended for the battery horses, raw bacon

captured from the enemy, and the water of springs, creeks and rivers. No doubt there were other commands suffering the same privations.

A soldier in the Army of Northern Virginia was fortunate when he had his flour, meat, sugar and coffee all at the same time and in proper quantity. Having these, the most skillful axeman of the mess hewed down a fine hickory or oak, and cut it into "lengths." All hands helped to "tote it" to the fire. When the wood was convenient, the fire was large and the red coals abundant.

The man most gifted in the use of the skillet was the one most highly appreciated about the fire, and as tyrannical as a Turk; but when he raised the lid of the oven and exposed the brown, crusted tops of the biscuit, animosity subsided. The frying pan, full of "grease," then became the centre of attraction. As the hollow-cheeked boy "sopped" his biscuit, his poor, pinched countenance wrinkled into a smile and his sunken eyes glistened with delight.

The strong men squatted around, chuckling over their good luck and "cooing"—like a child with a big piece of cake. Ah! this was a sight which but few of those who live and die are ever permitted to see.

And the coffee, too—how delicious the aroma of it, and how readily each man disposes of a quart.

And now the last biscuit is gone, the last drop of coffee, and the frying pan is "wiped" clean. The tobacco bag is pulled wide open, pipes are scraped, knocked out and filled, the red coal is applied, and the blue smoke rises in wreaths and curls from the mouths of the no longer hungry, but happy and contented soldiers.

Songs rise on the still night air, the merry laugh resounds, the woods are bright with the rising flame of the fire, story after story is told, song after song is sung, and at midnight the soldiers steal away one by one to their blankets on the ground and sleep till reveille. Such was a meal when the mess was fortunate. How different when the wagons had not been heard from for forty-eight hours, and the remnants of stock on hand had to do. Now, the question is, how to do the largest amount of good to the largest number with the smallest amount of material? The most experienced men discuss the situation and decide that "somebody" must go foraging. Though the stock on hand is small, no one seems anxious to leave the small certainty and go in search of the large uncertainty of supper from some farmer's well filled table. But at

last several comrades start out, and as they disappear the preparations for immediate consumption commence. The meat is too little to cook alone, and the flour will scarcely make six biscuit. The result is that "slosh" or "coosh" must do. So the bacon is fried out till the pan is half full of boiling grease. The flour is mixed with water until it flows like milk, poured into the grease and rapidly stirred till the whole is a dirty brown mixture. It is now ready to be served. Perhaps some dainty fellow prefers the more imposing "slap jack." If so, the flour is mixed with less water, the grease reduced, and the paste poured in till it covers the bottom of the pan, and, when brown on the underside, is by a nimble twist of the pan turned and browned again. If there is any sugar in camp it makes a delicious addition.

About the time the last scrap of "slap jack" and the last spoonful of "slosh" are disposed of, the unhappy foragers return. They take in the situation at a glance—realize with painful distinctness that they have sacrificed the homely slosh for the vain expectancy of applebutter, shortcake and milk, and, with woeful countenance and mournful voice, narrate their adventure and disappointment thus: "Well, boys, we have done the best *we* could. We have walked about nine miles over the mountain, and haven't found a *mouthful to eat*. Sorry, but it's a fact." "Billy Brown fell down the mountain and mashed his nose; Patso nearly scratched his eyes out with the briars, and we are all hungry as dogs—give us our biscuit." Of course there are none, and, as it is not contrary to army etiquette to do so, the whole mess professes to be very sorry, and is greatly delighted.

Sometimes, however, the foragers returned well laden with good things, and, as good comrades should, shared the fruits of their toilsome hunt with the whole mess. Foragers thought it not indelicate to linger about the house of the unsuspecting farmer till the lamp revealed the family at supper, and then modestly approach and knock at the door. An invitation to enter was almost certain to follow and was certainly accepted. The good hearted man knew that his guests were "posted" about the meal which was in progress in the next room, the invitation to supper was given, and, shall I say it, accepted with an unbecoming lack of reluctance.

The following illustrates the ingenuity of the average forager: There was great scarcity of meat, and no prospect of a supply from the wagons. Two experienced foragers were sent out, and as

a farmer about ten miles from the camp was killing hogs, guided by soldier instinct, they went directly to his house, and found the meat nicely cut up, the various pieces of each hog making a separate pile on the floor of an outhouse. The proposition to buy met with a surprisingly ready response on the part of the farmer. He offered one entire pile of meat, being one whole hog, for such a small sum that the foragers instantly closed the bargain, and as promptly opened their eyes to the danger which menaced them. They give the old gentleman a ten dollar bill and request the change. He is pleased with their honest method and hastens away to his house for the desired change.

The two honest foragers hastily examine the particular pile of pork which the simple hearted farmer has designated theirs, find it very rank and totally unfit for food, transfer half of it to another pile, from which they take half and add to theirs, and await the return of the farmer. He returns, gives them their change and assures them they have a bargain. They agree that they have, toss the good and bad together into a bag, say good-bye, and depart as rapidly as artillerymen on foot can. The result of this trip was a "pot-pie" of large dimensions, and some six or eight men gorged with fat pork, declaring that they had never cared and would never again wish to eat pork—especially pork-pies.

A large proportion of the eating of the army was done in the houses and at the tables of the people—not by the use of force, but by the wish and invitation of the people. It was at times necessary that whole towns should help to sustain the army of defence, and when this was the case, it was done voluntarily and cheerfully. The soldiers—all who conducted themselves properly—were received as honored guests and given the best in the house. There was a wonderful absence of stealing or plundering, and even when the people suffered from depredation they attributed the cause to terrible necessity rather than to wanton disregard of the rights of property. And when armed guards were placed over the smokehouses and barns, it was not so much because the Commanding General doubted the honesty as that he knew the necessities of his troops. But even pinching hunger was not held to be an excuse for marauding expeditions.

The inability of the government to furnish supplies forced the men to depend largely upon their own energy and ingenuity to obtain them. The officers knowing this, relaxed discipline to an extent which would seem, to an European officer for instance, ruinous.

It was no uncommon sight to see a brigade or division, which was but a moment before marching in solid column along the road, scattered over an immense field searching for the luscious blackberries. And it was wonderful to see how promptly and cheerfully all returned to the ranks when the field was gleaned. In the fall of the year a persimmon tree on the roadside would halt a column and detain it till the last persimmon disappeared.

The sutler's wagon, loaded with luxuries, which was so common in the Federal army, was unknown in the Army of Northern Virginia; and for two reasons, the men had no money to buy sutlers' stores and the country no men to spare for sutlers. The nearest approach to the sutler's wagon was the "cider cart" of some old darkey or a basket of pies and cakes displayed on the roadside for sale.

The Confederate soldier relied greatly upon the abundant supplies of eatables which the enemy was kind enough to bring him, and he cheerfully risked his life for the accomplishment of the two-fold purpose of whipping the enemy and getting what he called "a square meal." After a battle there was general feasting on the Confederate side. Good things, scarcely ever seen at other times, filled the haversacks and the stomachs of "Boys in Gray." Imagine the feelings of men half famished when they rush into a camp at one side, while the enemy flees from the other, and find the coffee on the fire, sugar at hand ready to be dropped into the coffee, bread in the oven, crackers by the box, fine beef ready cooked, desiccated vegetables by the bushel, canned peaches, lobsters, tomatoes, milk, barrels of ground and toasted coffee, soda, salt, and in short everything a hungry soldier craves. Then add the liquors, wines, cigars and tobacco found in the tents of the officers and the wagons of the sutlers, and remembering the condition of the victorious party, hungry, thirsty and weary, say if it did not require wonderful devotion to duty and great self denial to push on, trampling under foot the plunder of the camp, and pursue the enemy till the sun went down.

When it was allowable to halt, what a glorious time it was! Men who a moment before would have been delighted with a pone of corn-bread and a piece of fat meat now discuss the comparative merits of peaches and milk and fresh tomatoes, lobster and roast beef, and forgetting the briar-root pipe, faithful companion of the vicissitudes of the soldier's life, snuff the aroma of imported Havanas.

In sharp contrast with the mess-cooking at the big fire was the serious and diligent work of the man separated from his comrades, out of reach of the woods, but bent on cooking and eating. He has found a coal of fire, and having placed over it in an ingenious manner the few leaves and twigs near his post, he fans the little pile with his hat. It soon blazes. Fearing the utter consumption of his fuel, he hastens to balance on the little fire his tin cup of water. When it boils, from some secure place in his clothes, he takes a little coffee and drops it in the cup, and almost instantly the cup is removed and set aside; then the slice of fat meat is laid on the coals and when brown and crisp, completes the meal—for the “crackers” or biscuit are ready. No one but a soldier would have undertaken to cook with such a fire, as frequently it was no bigger than a quart cup.

Crackers, or “hard tack” as they were called, are notoriously poor eating, but in the hands of the Confederate soldier were made to do good duty. When on the march and pressed for time, a piece of solid fat pork and a dry cracker was passable or luscious, as the time was long or short since the last meal. When there was leisure to do it, hard tack was soaked well and then fried in bacon grease. Prepared thus it was a dish which no Confederate had the weakness or the strength to refuse.

Sorghum, in the absence of the better molasses of peace times, was greatly prized and eagerly sought after. A “Union” man living near the Confederate lines was one day busy boiling his crop. Naturally enough, some of “our boys” smelt out the place and determined to have some of the sweet fluid. They had found a yearling dead in the field hard by, and in thinking over the matter determined to sell the Union man if possible. So they cut from the dead animal a choice piece of beef, carried it to the old fellow and offered to trade. He accepted the offer and the whole party walked off with canteens full.

Artillerymen, having tender consciences and no muskets, seldom, if ever, shot stray pigs; but they did sometimes, as an act of friendship, wholly disinterested, point out to the infantry a pig which seemed to need shooting, and by way of dividing the danger and responsibility of the act, accept privately a choice part of the deceased.

On one occasion, when a civilian was dining with the mess, there was a fine pig for dinner. This circumstance caused the civilian to remark on the good fare. The “forager” remarked that

pig was an uncommon dish, this one having been kicked by one of the battery horses while stealing corn and instantly killed. The civilian seemed to doubt the statement after his teeth had come down hard on a pistol bullet, and continued to doubt though assured that it was the head of a horse-shoe nail.

The most melancholy eating a soldier was ever forced to do, was when pinched with hunger, cold, wet and dejected, he wandered over the deserted field of battle and satisfied his cravings with the contents of the haversacks of the dead. If there is anything which will overcome the natural abhorrence which a man feels for the enemy, the loathing of the bloated dead and the awe engendered by the presence of death, solitude and silence, it is hunger. Impelled by its clamoring men of high principle and tenderest humanity, become for the time void of sensibility and condescend to acts which, though justified by their extremity, seem afterwards, even to the doers, too shameless to mention.

When rations became so very small that it was absolutely necessary to supplement them, and the camp was permanently established, those men who had the physical ability worked for the neighborhood farmers at cutting cord-wood, harvesting the crops, killing hogs or any other farm-work. A stout man would cut a cord of wood a day and receive fifty cents in money or its equivalent in something eatable. Hogs were slaughtered for the "fifth quarter." When the corn became large enough to eat, the roasting ears, thrown in the ashes with the shucks on and nicely roasted, made a grateful meal. Turnip and onion patches also furnished delightful and much-needed food, good, raw or cooked.

Occasionally, when a mess was hard pushed for eatables, it became necessary to resort to some ingenious method of disgusting a part of the mess, that the others might eat their fill. The "pepper treatment" was a common method practiced with the soup, which once failed. A shrewd fellow who loved things "hot" decided to have plenty of soup, and to accomplish his purpose, as he passed and repassed the boiling pot, dropped in a pod of red pepper. But, alas! for him, there was another man like minded who adopted the same plan, and the result was the "mess" waited in vain for that pot of soup to cool.

The individual coffee boiler of one man in the Army of Northern Virginia was always kept at the boiling point. The owner of it was an enigma to his comrades. They could not understand his strange fondness for "red-hot" coffee. Since the war he has

explained that he found the heat of the coffee prevented its use by others and adopted the plan of placing his cup on the fire after every sip. This same character never troubled himself to carry a canteen, though a great water drinker. When he found a good canteen he would kindly give it to a comrade, reserving the privilege of an occasional drink when in need. He soon had an interest in thirty or forty canteens and their contents, and a drink of water if it was to be found in any of them. He pursued the same plan with blankets and always had plenty in that line. His entire outfit was the clothes on his back and a haversack accurately shaped to hold one half pone of corn bread.

Roasting-ear time was a trying time for the hungry privates. Having been fed during the whole of the winter on salt-meat and coarse bread, his system craved the fresh, luscious juice of the corn, and at times his honesty gave way under the pressure. How could he resist?—he didn't—he took some roasting ears! Sometimes the farmer grumbled, sometimes he quarreled and sometimes he complained to the officers of the depredations of "the men." The officers apologized, eat what corn they had on hand and sent their "boy" for some more.

One old farmer conceived the happy plan of inviting some privates to his house, stating his grievances and securing their co-operation in the effort to protect his corn. He told them that of course *they* were not the *gentlemen* who took his corn! Oh no! of course *they* would not do such a thing; but wouldn't *they* please speak to the others and ask them please not to take his corn? Of course! certainly! oh yes! they would certainly remonstrate with their comrades. How they burned though as they thought of the past and contemplated the near future. As they returned to camp through the field they filled their haversacks with the silky ears, and were met on the other side of the field by the kind farmer and a file of men who were only too eager to secure the plucked corn "in the line of duty."

A faithful officer, worn out with the long, weary march, sick, hungry and dejected, leaned his back against a tree and groaned to think of his inability to join in the chase of an old hare, which, he knew from the wild yells in the wood, his men were pursuing. But the uproar approached him—nearer, nearer and nearer until he saw the hare bounding towards him with a regiment at her heels. She spied an opening made by the folds of the officer's cloak and jumped in and he embraced his first meal for forty-eight hours.

An artilleryman was camped for a day where no water was to be had. During the night, awakened by thirst, he arose and stumbled about in search of water. To his surprise he found a large bucketful. He drank deep and with delight. In the morning he found that the water he drank had washed a bullock's head and was crimson with his blood.

Some stragglers came up one night and found the camp silent. All hands asleep. Being hungry they sought and to their great delight found a large pot of soup. It had a peculiar taste, but they "worried" it down, and in the morning bragged of their good fortune. The soup had defied the stomachs of the whole battery, being strongly impregnated with the peculiar flavor of defunct cockroaches.

Shortly before the evacuation of Petersburg, a country boy went hunting. He killed and brought to camp a muskrat. It was skinned, cleaned, buried a day or two, disinterred and eaten with great relish. It was splendid.

During the seven days' battles around Richmond, a studious private observed the rats as they entered and emerged from a corncrib. He killed one, cooked it privately and invited a friend to join him in eating a fine squirrel. The comrade consented, ate heartily, and when told what he had eaten, forthwith disgorged. But he confesses that up to the time when he was enlightened he had greatly enjoyed the meal.

It was at this time, when rats were a delicacy, that the troops around Richmond agreed to divide their rations with the poor of the city, and they were actually hauled in and distributed. Comment here would be like complimenting the sun on its brilliancy or warmth.

Orators dwell on the genius and skill of the general officers; historians tell of the movements of divisions and army corps, and the student of the art of war studies the geography and topography of the country and the returns of the various corps: they all seek to find and to tell the secret of success or failure.

The Confederate soldier knows the elements of his success—courage, endurance and devotion. He knows also by whom he was defeated—sickness, starvation, death. He fought not men only, but food, raiment, pay, glory, fame and fanaticism. He endured privation, toil and contempt. He won, and despite the cold indifference of all and the hearty hatred of some, he will have for all time, in all places where generosity is, a fame untarnished.

Relative Numbers at Gettysburg.

[We had expected ere this to have finished our "Gettysburg Series," but we are sure that our readers will be glad to have the two papers which follow on the numbers of the armies at that great battle—the second letter of our distinguished correspondent, the Count of Paris, and the able, exhaustive and conclusive paper of General Early, which seems to us to settle the question beyond all controversy.]

Letter from the Count of Paris.

CHATEAU D'EU, SEINE INFERIEURE,
March 23d, 1878.

Rev. J. WILLIAM JONES, *Secretary Southern Historical Society:*

With the permission of the Adjutant-General of the United States army, General Humphreys has kindly furnished me with a complete and authentic copy of the monthly return of the Army of Northern Virginia for the 31st of May, 1863. The inspection of that document settles at once the difficulties which I met with in the evaluation of the effective strength of Lee's army at Gettysburg, and which I had submitted to you. It explains the difference between Colonel Taylor's figures—which embraced only the enlisted men present for duty—and that given by General Humphreys, which comprises both officers and men present for duty. As the Federal reports always reckon the officers with the men, whenever a comparison is to be made between the forces of both armies it is the latter system which should be adopted. An error of nine in the aggregate of Rodes' division having been corrected by me, there is the same difference between the figures I give here and those of the original return. As some of these figures have been published, both by Mr. Swinton and by Colonel Taylor, but without the necessary explanations for their intelligence, I think it is no breach of confidence to give these figures and a few others with the required explanations:

On the 31st of May, the Army of Northern Virginia numbered 133,680 officers and men and 206 guns. Out of these 44,935 were absent and 88,745 present; the latter figure embraces 7,387 officers and men sick, 5,951 on extra duty and 948 in arrest. Lastly, there were present for duty 6,116 officers and 68,343 men, or, in the whole, 74,459. The division of this effective force between the different arms was as follows: General staff, 47; infantry, 69,418; cavalry, 10,292; artillery, 4,702. During the month of June this

force must have been increased somewhat by the regular operations of the draft, and by the return, both of sick men restored to health under the genial influence of the season and of the men recovering from slight wounds received a month before at Chancellorsville. If that increase is difficult to appreciate, there is another element which can be easily calculated—it is the reunion of three brigades which do not appear on the return for the 31st of May. These brigades were—first, Pettigrew's, nearly 4,000 men strong (before leaving in Virginia one of its five regiments); second, Jenkins' cavalry, and third, Imboden's mixed command, numbering together more than 2,500 men.

On the other hand the effective strength of the army was reduced by the three following causes: first, detachments; second, losses in fights; third, sickness, straggling and desertion. First, detachments: Corse's brigade of Pickett's division and one regiment of Pettigrew's brigade (about 800 strong) were sent to Hanover Junction (Virginia), and later Early left one regiment to escort the prisoners from Winchester, and two others to occupy that town. These forces can be reckoned at 3,500 men. Second, losses in fights: the losses at Fleetwood, Winchester, Middleburg, Upperville and Hanover (Pennsylvania) were 1,400. Third, sickness, straggling and desertion: the reduction of the army through these causes must have been very small. The marches of the army were in average neither excessive nor continuous; the weather was fine; the roads in good order; and I have the best authority to believe that Pettigrew's brigade, by example, which was less accustomed to hard marching than the rest of the army, reached Pennsylvania with at least as many men present for duty as when it crossed the Rapidan. Early's division had some of the hardest marching before it reached the Potomac, and therefore it can be taken as a fair standard of comparison. Thanks to General Early we have the elements for that comparison. On the 31st of May his division, which was the smallest but two of the army, numbered 6,943 officers and men present for duty; on the 20th of June (see *Southern Magazine*, September, 1872, page 318, foot-note) this figure has dwindled down to 5,638. The difference is 1,305, but that decrease must be ascribed altogether to the three above mentioned causes, viz: first, the detachment of three regiments, left at or about Winchester, at least 850; second, the loss in battle at Winchester, 162; third, therefore the reduction by sickness, straggling and desertion is only 293, unless the division should

have received individual accessions between the 1st and the 20th of June. At the latter date the *sick present* were 343. It cannot be supposed that when General Early started he dragged his sick men behind the division; therefore these 243 must have become sick during the march, and, as this number is superior to the whole reduction, it will be admitted that the division had been somehow recruited after the 1st of June; but for the sake of simplicity, I shall take in the whole, both of the possible increase by the draft and the return of sick and wounded soldiers, and of the reduction by sickness, straggling and desertion, and consider only the difference between the two. That difference I have shown to be for Early's division 293, or less than four per cent. The proportion for the whole army could not be quite as large, and therefore should not be reckoned at more than 2,600. In that case the reduction by the three above mentioned causes would be 7,500; the increase by addition of three brigades, 6,500, and therefore the net decrease, 1,000, leaving the effective force under Lee in Pennsylvania and Maryland the 1st of July at 73,500 men. If we deduct the cavalry on both sides, we can say that the Southern general fought with 62,000 or 63,000 men and 190 guns the 80,000 or 82,000 men and 300 guns with whom Meade encountered him at Gettysburg.

Excuse the length of this, and believe me, dear sir, yours truly,

L. P. D'ORLEANS, *Comte de Paris*.

P. S.—Here is the calculation to which I allude in the last sentence: Effective force of Stuart, May 31st, 10,292+Jenkins' and Imboden's cavalry, 2,200=12,500; minus losses in fights, 1,200, and other losses, 200; remains 11,100. 73,500-11,100=62,400. To be deducted also 16 guns with Stuart on one side, and 27 with Pleasonton on the other.

General Early's Reply to the Count of Paris.

The "Remarks on the Numerical Strength of both Armies at Gettysburg," by the Comte de Paris, published in the April number of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, contain some very serious errors which it becomes necessary to notice.

The first error which I will examine is contained in the following passage: "The total is the figure which is generally given in both armies where only one is given, the number of men on detached

service being liable to vary greatly from day to day." By "detached service," he evidently means "extra or daily duty," which is a very different thing from detached service. With this understanding as to his meaning, his remark, that the number of men on such duty varied greatly from day to day, does not apply to the Confederate army. At a very early day it had been found injudicious and unsafe to employ negroes as teamsters and laborers for the army when it was in an active campaign, and when the conscript act became a law, and all able-bodied white men were made liable to military duty, it of course became necessary to detail from the ranks all the teamsters and laboring men required. The number of these was very considerable, in order to furnish drivers for the baggage and supply trains, as well as such men as were required for manual labor in the several staff departments; and the details were permanent and of course not liable to vary from day to day. It was owing to this fact that the number of men reported on extra duty in the Confederate army greatly exceeded, in proportion to strength, that reported on extra or daily duty with the Federal army. With the latter the men on extra or daily duty might be made available for a fight, whereas in the Confederate army the teamsters, whose presence with their teams was always necessary, were no more available in a fight than the mules they drove.

The next errors to be noticed are found in the following passage: "Through the operations of the draft the effective strength of each regiment had been increased after Chancellorsville. The regiments had received some recruits between the 15th and the 31st of May; some more came between the 10th and 1st of June. Von Borcke says that the regiments of cavalry were largely increased in that way, but I am not satisfied by such vague statements, and in order to prove the fact I propose to calculate the average strength of the regiments from the known strength of several corps, divisions or brigades a few days before the battle, as stated by reliable authorities, and mostly by official reports."

The assumption that our army was increased in strength after Chancellorsville through the operation of the draft, or by recruits in any way, is without the slightest foundation in fact. Major Von Borcke's sketches are not at hand to refer to, but if he has made the remark attributed it to him, he is wholly mistaken. It is very far from my purpose to say anything in the slightest degree disparaging to that chivalrous foreigner, whose sympathy for our cause and gallant deeds in its defence have given him a place in the

heart of every true Confederate; but it did not come within his province to be familiar with the statistics of the army, or even of the cavalry with which he served. The cavalry was an arm of the service that was never recruited by conscripts, and in May, 1863, the only recruits that were obtainable from voluntary enlistment were the young men just arriving at the military age. As our cavalymen had to furnish their own horses, and keep themselves mounted at their own expense, it was the practice to permit a large number to go to their homes during the winter and early spring months, for the purpose of recruiting their horses and obtaining new ones when they were dismounted. These men generally returned at the period for active operations, and in that way the cavalry was strengthened on the opening of a campaign. It is this fact, it is presumed, that Major Von Boreke refers to, or that led him into error if he has made the remark as broadly as the Comte de Paris states it. The opening of the cavalry operations prior to the Chancellorsville campaign, and that campaign had recalled to the army all the available cavalymen, and the returns of May 31st, must have shown the whole cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia that was available for the approaching movement. If any raw recruits had been received after that time, they would have been worthless from the want of training and seasoning of the men as well as of their horses.

There is a very great misapprehension existing in the minds of persons outside of the Confederacy, and even among officers of the Confederate army, as to the number of men put into the army under the conscript law. In a report to the Secretary of War, dated the 30th of April, 1864, General John S. Preston, Superintendent of the Bureau of Conscription, says: "The results indicate this grave consideration for the government—that fresh material for the armies can no longer be estimated as an element of future calculation for their increase; and that necessity demands the invention of devices for keeping in the ranks the men now borne on the rolls."

In a report made in February, 1865, General Preston gives a table showing the "number of conscripts enrolled and assigned to the army from camps of instructions since the act of Congress, April 16, 1862," from which it appears that the whole number of men added to the army east of the Mississippi, in that way, up to that time, was 81,993, exclusive of some obtained under the operations of General Pillow in the States of Alabama and Mississippi. He estimates the number of volunteers who joined the army during

the same period, without passing through camps of instruction, at 72,292. Of course the greater number of these conscripts, as well as the volunteers, went into the army during the first year succeeding the passage of the conscript act; and hence there were very few to be obtained after the battle of Chancellorsville, and they consisted exclusively of men who had managed to evade the conscript officers, and the few arriving at the conscript age.

In a letter addressed by General Lee to the Secretary of War on the 11th of February, 1863, he says:

"Sir—I think it very important to increase the strength of all our armies to the maximum by the opening of the next campaign. Details of officers and men have been sent from all the brigades of this army to collect deserters and absentees. By the return of last month, forwarded to the Department to-day, you will perceive that our strength is not much increased by the arrival of conscripts; only four hundred and twenty-one are reputed to have joined by enlistment, and two hundred and eighty-seven to have returned from desertion, making an aggregate of seven hundred and sixty-eight, whereas our loss by death, discharges and desertion amounts to eighteen hundred and seventy-eight. Now is the time to gather all our strength, and to prepare for the struggle which must take place in the next three months. I beg you to use every means in your power to fill up our ranks."

These documents are to be found in the final report of the Provost-Marshal General of the United States ("messages and documents, War Department, part 3, 1865-'66"), pages 122, 128 and 131, and were printed from the originals in the "Archive office." I have my own official returns for the entire year 1863, being the office copies which were retained, and the return for January 31st, 1863, shows that 52 joined my division by enlistment during that month, being within less than one of one-eighth of the number received in the whole army for the same time. My return for February shows 45 received by enlistment for that month, while the loss by death, discharges and desertion was 305. My return for March shows 96 received by enlistment, while the loss by death, discharges and desertion was 231. There was no monthly return for April by reason of active hostilities progressing at the end of that month; and my next return for May 31st shows 60 received by enlistment for the two preceding months, while the loss by death during that period was 327, a considerable portion being in battle, and by discharges and desertions, 327 for the same period, making a total loss of 754. The next monthly return was for July 31st, and that shows 77 received by enlistment during the months of

June and July, they being received after the return from the Gettysburg campaign, and the loss by death for the same period was 344, being mostly in battle, and by discharges and desertion it was 160. So that the recruits by enlistment, during the whole period, from the 1st of January to the 1st of August, 1863, did not amount to half the loss by discharges and desertion, leaving that by death out of the question. Three of my brigades were from Virginia, North Carolina and Georgia, the States from which conscripts for the Army of Northern Virginia were principally received. My returns show that very nearly the whole of the recruits received in the division were from those States, the greater number being from North Carolina. So if recruits were received to any extent by the Army of Northern Virginia between the 31st of May, 1863, and the time that army crossed the Potomac, my division returns would indicate the fact. That they do not do so is very conclusive evidence that the assumption of the Comte de Paris is wholly unwarranted.*

*NOTE.—In a communication to the Secretary of the Southern Historical Society from the Comte de Paris, dated March 23d, he states that he has now obtained a full copy of the returns of the Army of Northern Virginia for May 31st, 1863, by permission of the Adjutant-General of the United States army, but it does not appear that he has either applied for or obtained a copy of the return of Meade's army for the 30th of June, 1863, or at any other time—a fact which does not argue that diligent and impartial research which should characterize one who assumes the role of an historian.

In making his deductions from the return of May 31st, 1863, as he now has it, he again falls into some errors which it is proper to notice. He says: "Early's division had some of the hardest marching before it reached the Potomac," &c. In this he is mistaken. The march from Fredericksburg to the vicinity of Culpeper Courthouse had been very deliberate, occupying from the 4th to the 8th of June, inclusive. From the vicinity of Culpeper Courthouse to Winchester, a distance of about fifty miles, the division had marched in four days—from the 10th to the 13th, inclusive. After being engaged around Winchester the afternoon of the 13th, the 14th and the morning of the 15th, having taken a day's rest, it moved to Shepherdstown on the Potomac, a distance of between thirty and thirty-five miles, by the 20th. It had thus occupied ten days in reaching the Potomac from the vicinity of Culpeper Courthouse, a distance of about eighty miles—one day and parts of two others being occupied in the operations around Winchester. Longstreet's corps left Culpeper Courthouse on the 15th, and Hill's left the heights of Fredericksburg on the same day, and, as they crossed the Potomac on the 25th, after Longstreet's corps had done some extra marching to support Stuart's cavalry, it follows that both corps did much severer marching before crossing the Potomac, than my division or any other part of Ewell's corps had done. The weather was also more sultry during the period of their march than it had been during ours.

The Comte now finds, by comparison of the returns of my division for the 31st of May with that of the 20th of June, that there was a loss of only 293, after deducting for the three regiments left behind, and the losses in action, which he states to be less than four per cent. He is here again mistaken. 293 is a little over four per cent. on 6,943, the entire strength of my division for duty on the 31st of May, and deducting the 850, which he allows for the three regiments left behind, it amounts to very nearly five per cent. on the residue of the division. But the fact is, that in the return of June the 20th was included the Thirty-first Virginia regiment, which was not included in the return of the 31st of May, as I have above explained. That regiment numbered for duty, on the 20th of June, 280, which, being added to the 293 assumed by the Comte to be my total loss, makes a loss of 573 in the portion of the division included in both returns, being very nearly nine and a half per cent.

His method of estimating our strength by taking my regiments as the average for the whole army is not warranted by the facts of the case. The return for May 20th, as given by Colonel Taylor, shows present for duty in the entire army at that date, in the infantry, 55,261 officers and men. This does not include the general officers and their staff. I had nineteen regiments in my division included in that return, and the number of officers and men present for duty, excluding general and staff officers, was 6,421. There were certainly one hundred and sixty-nine regiments and battalions present in the army at that time, and there may possibly have been another. The average for my nineteen regiments would be 338, and this multiplied by 169 gives 57,122, being in excess of the number actually present for duty 1,861. Multiply by 167, the number of regiments assumed by the Comte to have been at Gettysburg, and it gives 56,446, an excess of 1,185. But three of my smallest regiments were left behind in the Valley, and taking their joint strength (773 present for duty) on the 20th of May, there would be left 5,648, giving an average of 353 for the sixteen which were present on the 20th of May and also at Gettysburg. Multiply 353 by 169, and it gives 59,657, an excess of 4,396 above the number actually present; and by 167 it gives 58,951, an excess of 3,690 above the number actually present. The return of May 31st, as now correctly given, shows present for duty in the infantry, including all officers, a total of 59,457. In my division there were present for duty at the same time 6,943, giving an average of 365 to the nineteen regiments present. This multiplied by 169 gives 61,685, an excess of 2,128 above the number actually present; and by 167 gives 60,955, an excess of 1,498 above the number actually present. Taking off 919, the strength of the regiments detached, and the other sixteen had 6,024, giving them an

As there were no detachments made from Hays' and Gordon's brigades, and no additions to either, I have taken those two brigades to ascertain the ratio of decrease, in the absence of the return of the Thirty-first Virginia for the 31st of May, and of the three detached regiments and battalion for the 20th of June.

In those two brigades the decrease, exclusive of loss in action, was a little over ten per cent., and hence, as the marching they had done was not as severe as that done by Longstreet's and Hill's corps before they crossed the Potomac, I have assumed ten per cent, as the ratio of decrease in the whole army.

It is a little curious that, as the Comte thinks the loss in our army must have been very small from sickness, straggling and desertion, on account of the very fine weather (another fact about which he is greatly mistaken, as will be recollected by those who had to endure, without shelter, the heavy rains and cold nights we frequently had), he should make the decrease in Meade's army so excessive for the four days preceding the battle of Gettysburg.

It is true, as the Comte says, that when there were but eight divisions in the army there were but two smaller than mine, but when the number was increased to nine, mine became and remained more than an average one in size.

average of 376, which, being multiplied by 169, gives 63,544, an excess of 4,087 above the number actually present, and by 167 gives 62,792, an excess of 3,335 above the number actually present. One of my regiments, the Thirty-first Virginia, was absent and not embraced in the returns of May 20th and 31st, but had returned on the 3d of June, and was embraced in the returns of June the 10th and 20th; so I had only seventeen regiments at Gettysburg, instead of eighteen as the Comte supposes. The strength of the Thirty-first Virginia in present for duty, on the 20th of June, was 280. Adding the strength of this regiment to that of the sixteen present on the 31st of May, and counting the seventeen as eighteen, and the average thus obtained would be about that of the regiments for the whole army. I had a small battalion of two companies, but as two of my regiments wanted a company each, I have not counted it, and as that battalion was detached permanently before the 20th of June and is not embraced in the return of that date, its strength is included in the 919 deducted for the strength, on the 31st of May, of the regiments that were left behind. The Comte's mode therefore of estimating the strength of our infantry, by taking the average for my regiments as the average for the whole number, is not correct, though he arrives at very nearly its strength when it crossed the Potomac by mistaking the number of my regiments. I estimate that we had 169 regiments and battalions at Gettysburg, of which six were battalions, and I think there can be no doubt that that was the precise number of infantry organizations there, not including in them the battalion employed as a provost guard at army headquarters, and the battalion of two companies from my division employed in the same way at corps headquarters.

The Comte makes no allowance for decrease in our infantry after it crossed the Potomac, and hence he gives as its strength at Gettysburg what it probably was on crossing the Potomac. He is entirely mistaken in assuming that I had a battery attached to one of my brigades. This was not the case—I had a battalion of four batteries which accompanied my division, and that is to be counted with the artillery of the army. He is equally mistaken in saying that Imboden had a few hundred infantry with him. Imboden had had three regiments of infantry with him on an expedition into Northwestern Virginia in the spring, to wit: the Twenty-second Virginia of General Sam. Jones' command, the Twenty-fifth Virginia of Johnson's division, and the Thirty-first Virginia of my division, all of which had returned to their re-

spective commands. He had the Sixty-second Virginia regiment, called mounted infantry, but it was armed precisely like the rest of his command, which consisted of a regiment and a battalion of cavalry, with a battery attached.

The Comte arrives at the conclusion that we had at the battle 66,639 present for duty of all arms, of which 52,571 was infantry, 4,190 artillery and 9,878 cavalry, and a total present of 75,783. The discovery of the error made by Colonel Taylor and Mr. Swinton, in omitting to count the officers present for duty on the 31st of May, shows that the total of officers and men present for duty at that date was 74,451, of which 6,099 were officers and 68,352 enlisted men. The officers include those of all grades, and among them were 935 chaplains, quartermasters, commissaries, surgeons, assistant surgeons, and ordnance and signal officers, who did not belong to the fighting department. As one brigade of five regiments that was counted in the returns of May 31st and three regiments of my division were left in Virginia, to replace which was another brigade of four regiments, two regiments that had been with Imboden, and perhaps two other regiments in Davis' newly formed brigade, it may be assumed that the number of men thus added was about the number in the brigade and regiments that were left behind—that is, 74,451 officers and men for duty may be assumed as the basis of the calculations to be made to arrive proximately at the strength of our army when it reached Gettysburg. Of course the difference between that number and 68,352 makes a considerable difference in the estimates. As we were going away from the section from which we could be reinforced, the idea of the Comte de Paris that conscripts were hurried on to overtake us and fill our ranks, is to be entirely discarded; the only real additions made to the army were the cavalry brigades of Jenkins and Imboden.

My own division was certainly as good a one as any in that army, and having been trained under Stonewall Jackson, it was as well enured to marching and the hardships of an active campaign as any. Whatever ratio of decrease, therefore, occurred in that division may safely be assumed as the ratio of decrease for the whole infantry of the army. No troops were detached from Hays' and Gordon's brigades, and no additions were made to them between the 31st of May and the 20th of June. They jointly numbered 4,016 for duty on the 31st of May, and 3,447 on the 20th of June, showing a loss of 569, of which 163 was for loss in action.

Their loss then from other causes than casualties in battle was a little over ten per cent. By an oversight in my article in the last December number of the *Papers*, the loss between the 10th and 20th of June was stated at twelve per cent., when it should have been ten per cent.

My return for June 20th showed 5,643 for duty, including five chaplains, and my return for July 10th at Hagerstown showed 4,144, giving a loss of 1,449, of which 1,181 was in battle, leaving a loss of 318, a little over five and a half per cent., from other causes than casualties in battle. My aggregate present on the 20th of June was 6,476, and on the 10th of July it was 4,791, being a loss of 1,685, from which the loss in battle being deducted leaves 504, or a loss of very nearly eight per cent. from other causes than casualties in battle on the aggregate present. The greater part of this doubtless resulted from leaving the sick behind, or sending them to the rear. As it took us only three days to march from Gettysburg to Hagerstown, at which latter place we arrived on the 7th, there had been time for all the men with the trains to join the division. In fact a return made on the 8th showed 261 less for duty, and 408 less in the aggregate present on that day than on the 10th. I may assume therefore, that there was a loss of five and a half per cent. in my division from the 20th of June to the beginning of the battle, and that there was the same ratio of decrease in the rest of our infantry during the same period. To show the likelihood of there being at least as much loss in Longstreet's and Hill's corps as in Ewell's, I quote from General Kershaw's report the following statement: "Tuesday, June 16th, the brigade marched to Sperryville; 17th, to Mud run in Fauquier county. These two days were excessively hot, and on the 17th many cases of sunstroke occurred." General Hill started from the heights of Fredericksburg on the 15th, I believe, and his march had to be rapid to join Longstreet's corps, and hence the probability is that the loss in his corps exceeded the ratio in my division.

Take as the full strength of the infantry, May 31st.....	59,457
Deduct for chaplains, quartermasters and other non-combatant officers	786
	<hr/> 58,671
Off ten per cent.	5,867
	<hr/> 52,804
Probable strength of infantry on reaching the Potomac.....	52,804
Deduct 5½ per cent. after that time.....	2,904
	<hr/>

Probable strength of infantry at Gettysburg.....	48,900
Add for cavalry.....	6,000
For artillery.....	4,000
Probable strength in all arms at the battle.....	59,900

Major McClellan, Stuart's Adjutant-General, says that there was, at the beginning of the campaign, less than 6,000 for duty in the three brigades of cavalry that were with Stuart when he crossed the Potomac, there being about 4,500 in the two brigades of Robertson and Jones. He further says that the losses in action in these three brigades, which bore the brunt of the battle of Fleetwood, and the cavalry fights near the Blue Ridge, and from hard service and deficiency of forage, had reduced them to less than 4,000 when he crossed the Potomac; and he thinks to about 3,500. General Fitz. Lee thinks they were under 4,000 strong at the battle. This loss was not unreasonable, as will be seen when we come to notice that in the Federal cavalry. Jenkins' brigade, which was not embraced in the returns of May 31st, was about 1,600 strong before it crossed the Potomac, and White's battalion, which belonged to Jones' brigade, did not exceed 200. 6,000, therefore, will cover all the cavalry we had available for the battle. The artillery numbered 4,702 on the 31st of May, and some of it was very evidently left in Virginia with Corse's brigade, as the return for July 20th shows more present for duty in the artillery at that date than on the 31st of May. Some therefore must have rejoined the army by the former date, and very probably some that had been left with Jenkins' brigade near Suffolk had come back. We had 252 pieces with the infantry, as shown by a statement furnished me by General Pendleton, and allowing 15 men to a piece, which would be a superabundance, would give 3,780 men. Add 220 for the officers, giving nearly one to a piece, and we have 4,000, which certainly covered the artillery force with the infantry. There were 16 pieces of horse artillery with the cavalry, the men for which were returned with the cavalry, and as part thereof. They are included in the 6,000 allowed for that arm.

We had therefore not exceeding 60,000 men of all arms for duty at Gettysburg. In this estimate I do not include the cavalry brigades of Robertson, Jones and Imboden, which did not arrive in time to take part in the battle, and should not be counted as part of the force available for it. If they are to be counted as a part of our force at Gettysburg, then the 8,000 men under French at Frederick, which were employed in protecting Meade's com-

munications to the rear, and threatening ours, and Couch's force, a part of which was marching to Meade's assistance, and between a portion of which and Stuart's cavalry there was a conflict at Carlisle, on the 1st of July, should be counted as parts of Meade's force.

The loss in the aggregate present in my division, exclusive of losses in action and the regiments left behind, was fifteen per cent. from the 31st of May to the 20th of June, and after that near eight per cent. Deduct the same per cent. from 88,754, the aggregate present in the whole army on the 31st of May, and there would be less than 70,000 as the aggregate present at Gettysburg, without making any deduction for Robertson's and Jones' brigades.

It is, however, when the Comte de Paris comes to estimate Meade's force that he commits the greatest errors. It is a fact to be noted that he does not once refer to any official returns of that army, when it was a very easy thing for him to obtain them, and the return for the 30th of June, the day before the battle began, ought to furnish the very best evidence of Meade's force at the battle, but he resorts to the vague declarations of Federal officers, though he refuses to take the estimates of Confederate officers as to our strength in the absence of any return later than the 31st of May. This does not speak very well for his impartiality. When he ascertains what the Federal officers state as their present for duty, he insists that they mean thereby the aggregate present, including all men on extra duty, sick and in arrest, and then cuts down that number at a most extravagant rate. He says: "Whenever Federal officers gave what they called their effective strength, the figures represented always all the men present and not only those present for duty." This was not only not the case generally, but it was not the case when he was connected with the Army of the Potomac. McClellan, in his report, page 11, gives the strength of that army at various periods—that for the 20th June, 1862, six days before the Seven Days' battles began, being given as follows:

	PRESENT.						Aggregate.
	FOR DUTY.		SICK.		IN ARREST OR CONFINEMENT.		
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	
1862—June 20.....	4,665	101,160	496	10,541	44	320	117,236

Now, will the Comte pretend to say that McClellan intended by this that his effective strength was 117,226 on the 20th of June? In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, McClellan said: "The largest number of men I had for duty at any time on the Peninsula was 107,000 men;" and in reply to the question: "How many available men did you estimate that you had at Harrison's Bar?" he said: "I think I had about 85,000 or 90,000 men at Harrison's Bar." The same statement in his report that has been referred to, shows that on the 10th of July, 1862, when he was at Harrison's Bar, he had, present for duty, 3,834 officers and 85,715 men, total 89,549 for duty, and an aggregate present of 106,466. The Comte, therefore, is slightly mistaken in this respect, and the fact will abundantly appear from the various returns of McClellan contained in the same volume with his testimony, which are certified by the Adjutant-General. Upon this unwarranted assumption, the Comte takes the figures stated by Butterfield and Meade as the present for duty as the aggregate present, and then cuts them down by deducting thirteen per cent. for the men on extra duty, sick and in arrest. This is directly in the teeth of the return for the 30th of June, 1863, which I have been able to procure through the kindness of a friend in Congress, and to which return I will refer again when I come to estimate Meade's force.

The Comte is again grievously at fault when he says: "The Federal regiments were certainly not stronger than the Confederate ones. The reason is, that by the operation of the draft, however limited, the old regiments in the Southern army were at certain times refilled by recruits, while on the Union side, whenever a new call of volunteers was made it was by the creation of new regiments. It is a well known fact that as soon as a regiment left for the army it ceased to recruit itself."

He seems to think there was very great efficiency in the conscript act in keeping our regiments filled. Now, there were something over 500 regiments and 100 battalions of infantry, and smartly over 100 regiments of cavalry in the Confederate service, besides a great many battalions and batteries of artillery, as will be seen by reference to Colonel Jones' roster, which is imperfect in not giving all the regiments we had. Say we had 700 regiments in all to keep up, and 81,993 conscripts divided among them would give about 117 to a regiment, which would not refill it often. Add the 72,292 volunteers, and it would give only 154,285 men that were available

for recruiting all the Confederate armies east of the Mississippi river, after the 16th of April, 1862, up to February, 1865. Let us see how it was on the other side. The Comte seems to be unaware of the fact that, on the third day of March, 1863, an act of the United States Congress was approved, which provides for conscription, though generally designated the "Enrolment Act." On the 17th of March, 1863, the Bureau for Enrolment and Conscription was organized under Brigadier-General James B. Fry as Provost-Marshall General (see his report, page 13), and on the 1st of May, 1863, an order was issued giving it the superintendence of the entire volunteer recruiting system (same page). After the 3d of March there were no more calls on the States except for "emergency men." The Provost-Marshall General, in his report (page 2), says:

"One million one hundred and twenty thousand six hundred and twenty-one (1,120,621) men were raised, at an average cost (on account of recruitment, exclusive of bounties) of nine dollars and eighty-four cents (\$9.84) per man; while the cost of recruiting the one million three hundred and fifty-six thousand five hundred and ninety-three (1,356,593) raised prior to the organization of the Bureau was thirty-four dollars and one cent (\$34.01) per man."

Of the 1,356,593 raised before the organization of the Bureau, 1,146,189 were for three years, as shown by a table on page 160 of the report, 18,000 of them being called for for the navy; and if all that number went into that service, there were left 1,128,189 three years' men for the army. On page 57 he says that in the summer of 1863, 956 volunteer regiments, 7 independent battalions, 61 independent companies, and 158 volunteer batteries were in the service. There were then less than 1,000 regiments, including those in the regular army, for the 1,128,189 three years' men to be divided among, which would give over 1,128 men to a regiment. From the beginning to the close of the war, there was not quite 600,000 men put in the Confederate army in any way, which would give less than 1,000 each that the Confederate regiments received from the beginning to the close of the war. Of course it follows, as a necessary consequence, that in June, 1863, the Federal regiments were greatly larger than the Confederate regiments were at that time, unless we had rendered *hors de combat* a great many more of them than they had of us. Besides the troops put into the field before the passage of the Federal conscript act, it appears from the Provost-Marshall General's report (page 53), that 13,971

militia were furnished by New York, and 32,104 by Pennsylvania in June, 1863, upon a call "by the President for troops to meet the emergency created by the rebel invasion, which culminated in the battle of Gettysburg." These militia men, who were admirably armed, equipped and clothed, were certainly as good as any conscripts that the Confederate government could have sent forward to recruit our army after it started. I will here state that it appears (page 149) that of the 1,120,621 men furnished by the Bureau of Enrolment, only 168,649 men were actually drafted into the army, leaving 951,972 who were raised by voluntary enlistment by that Bureau; and of course they were put into old organizations. It is not unreasonable to suppose that some of them were put into the service before the battle of Gettysburg, as that Bureau began its operations for raising volunteers in May, 1863. The Comte has therefore jumped to his conclusion that "the Federal regiments were certainly not stronger than the Confederate ones." His statement, that "the figures given by Meade and Butterfield do not show, as has been alleged by Dr. Bates, all the men borne upon the rolls; nor, I think, as Confederate writers have asserted, only the men present for duty on the battle-field, but all the men who at the morning call were not reported absent, whatever may be their occupation at that time; the men known as having fallen off the ranks not being generally reported absent at once, to give them a chance to join without losing their pay, the usual stragglers were in fact embraced in that figure,"—is calculated to excite a smile from any military man, and would no doubt elicit an indignant protest from General Meade if he were alive. Of all men about an army, the most worthless was a straggler, for he was always up to get his share of the rations, but never present to do his share of the fighting. The deserter was infinitely better, for by absenting himself he ceased to be a burthen on the commissariat of the army, and rendered fully as much service as the straggler. No military man of one grain of sense would be likely to count him as a part of his "effective strength in battle." In using the terms "effective strength," and "present for duty," Generals Meade and Butterfield knew the full import of the terms they used, as is conclusively shown by the report of the 30th June, 1863, supervised by the one and signed by the other. The following are abstracts from the returns of June 20th and 30th and July 10th, 1863:

There are in the returns a great many columns with various headings to show those present sick, on extra duty, and in arrest, and so with the absent, as well as for alterations. All the figures under these various heads are not given in the transcript furnished me, but enough is given to show all the present for duty, and the aggregate present, as well as the aggregate present and absent. Opposite the cavalry in the returns for June 20th and 30th is this remark: "Taken from last return received, May 31st, 1863." Opposite the artillery in the return for July 10th is this note: "Brigade of regular batteries, aggregate 595, omitted in last report of June 30 (on account of loss of previous returns and absence of the officer who could replace them), included as gain in this report."

Hooker in his testimony (page 162) says that, at Fairfax Court-house, Stahl's cavalry, numbering 6,100 sabres, was added to his cavalry—which was about the 16th or 17th of June.

As the cavalry for duty on the 31st of May numbered 10,192, the addition of Stahl's increased it to over 16,000, from which are to be deducted the losses in action, &c.; but as the return for July 10th showed 11,842 for duty in that arm at that date, it must have numbered considerably more than 12,000 for duty at Gettysburg. The brigade of regular batteries, out of an aggregate of 595, must have numbered at least 500 for duty according to the ratio in the other artillery, and that ought to be added to the present for duty at the battle. Lockwood's Maryland brigade joined the Twelfth corps on the morning of the 2d of July, and Stannard's Vermont brigade was added to the First corps on the same morning: of this fact I am positively assured by the Comte de Paris in a letter to me, and Bates also states it. But the fact is very apparent that they were not included in the returns of those corps for the 30th from the returns themselves. Butterfield and Bates show that they numbered 2,500 each, making 5,000 for the two, and that number should be added. We shall thus have—

Number for duty by report of 30th June.....	99,475
Lockwood's and Stannard's brigades.....	5,000
Addition to cavalry, say.....	2,000
Brigade of regular batteries.....	500
Total for duty.....	106,975

Meade certainly had at least that number for duty at Gettysburg, though all of it might not be regarded as effective for a fight. His report, however, shows what was the actual force of infantry

and artillery equipped and ready for the fight on the 30th, under the heading of "Present for duty equipped." At the foot of the transcript, which is given on the regular printed form, is this printed note: "Under the heading 'Present for duty equipped' only those will be given who are actually available for the line of battle at the date of the regimental reports"—that is, it includes none but line officers and men who actually go into the fight. For June 30th the number so present and equipped in the cavalry is not given, but it is given in the return for July 10th, and then amounted to 11,045. It can therefore be safely assumed to have been 12,000 at Gettysburg. The numbers under that heading then are as follows:

Infantry—Officers	5,286
Enlisted men.....	71,922
Add for Lockwood's and Stannard's brigades.....	5,000
Total infantry	82,208
Artillery—Officers.....	194
Enlisted men.....	6,498
Add for regular batteries.....	500
Total artillery.....	7,192
Cavalry	12,000
Total "Present for duty equipped".....	101,400

Thus we get the actual fighting force available, after eliminating all the general and staff officers, provost guard, engineer brigade, signal corps and guards and orderlies, at over 100,000 officers and men. In my estimate of our own strength, I have only taken out the staff officers, who, under no circumstances, were required to get under fire, and left in all general officers and their staff officers, including engineer officers, as well as the non-commissioned staff officers. By an examination of the returns for the reserve artillery and the corps, it will be seen that besides the 2,580 at army headquarters, there are 2,803 officers and men reported for duty who are excluded from the statement of the "Present for duty equipped" in Meade's army.

No amount of figuring by the Comte de Paris, and no *hocus pocus* with his figures by General Humphreys, can evade the conclusive proof of the official return of the 30th of June, which bears Meade's signature.

Add for Lockwood's and Stannard's brigades, the increase in the

cavalry from the 31st of May, and the brigade of regular batteries to the 112,988, and the aggregate present would be smartly above 120,000.

In order to show how fallacious is the Comte's theory that there was a decrease of the number for duty in the Army of the Potomac on the march, it is only necessary to compare the returns of June the 20th and 30th together. At the former date, the return shows, in the seven corps, a total present for duty of 78,889, whereas at the latter date the return shows a total present for duty in these same corps of 84,135, being an increase of 5,246. The only evidence of any addition to these corps in the way of new troops is in regard to the addition of two brigades of Crawford's division to the Fifth corps, and the increase in the present for duty in that corps is only 2,908, in the aggregate present 3,234, and in the aggregate present and absent 4,495; whereas there was a total increase, in the present and absent of the seven corps, of 5,560. It appears that there was an increase in the Second corps of 2,355 in the aggregate present and absent, and an increase of the present for duty of 1,681. In the Eleventh corps there was an increase in the aggregate present and absent of 190, and in the present for duty of 42. There must, therefore, have been some additions to the Second and Eleventh corps in the way of recruits, or new organizations attached to them, of which no account is given. In each of the other corps there was a small decrease in the aggregate present and absent, and in all of them, except the Third corps, there was an increase in the number present for duty, showing that the additions to them in the latter respect were from the return of convalescents or others to duty. In the Third corps there was a decrease of 22 in the present for duty. Now, when the returns show a gradual increase in the numbers present for duty, and the aggregate present also, from from the 20th to the 30th of June, though the army was moving all the time, that increase being independent of any recruits or addition of new troops, the Comte de Paris has undertaken a task simply impossible in attempting to show that there was a decrease of thirteen per cent. in the numbers reported for duty on the 30th of June, or stated to have been present for duty on the 28th, in so short a space of time. In order to succeed, he must first show that false returns were made out by both Hooker and Meade.

The return for May 31st showed 10,192 present for duty in Pleasanton's cavalry, and there was added to it Stahl's cavalry of 6,100 sabres, making the whole about 16,300, and this the Comte reduces

to 10,440 at the battle, thus disposing of near 6,000, while he is only willing to allow for a loss of 1,100 in battle in Stuart's cavalry, and 1,606 more from other causes. Now, if Pleasanton's cavalry had been reduced by the casualties in battle and the wear and tear of the campaign, when the government furnished new horses to the dismounted men, from 16,300 to 12,000 (the figure at which I put it at Gettysburg), is it unreasonable to assume that Stuart's cavalry had been reduced in the same ratio during the same period—that is, from 10,292 to 7,500, thus giving Stuart 4,000 in the three brigades with him, and 3,500 with Robertson and Jones?

The Comte de Paris must not be surprised if he is suspected of not treating this question of numbers with the impartiality that is demanded of a historian.

General Fitz. Lee, as shown by the first part of his very clever article on the battle of Gettysburg, in the April number of the *Papers*, has permitted himself to be misled by Federal officers as to the numbers on their side at the battle. In a note referring to Colonel Taylor's estimate of the strength of the two armies, he says: "The Federal force is overestimated. Their total of all arms was about 90,000. General Humphreys puts, in a letter to me, the Federal infantry at 70,000, inclusive of 5,000 officers."

By reference to the abstracts I have given, the accuracy of which he can verify, if he thinks proper, by inquiry at the Adjutant-General's office, General Fitz. Lee will see that in the seven corps of the Army of the Potomac, there were, on the 30th of June, 5,286 officers and 71,922 enlisted men, making a total of 77,208 "Present for duty equipped"—that is, ready to go into a fight; and when Lockwood's and Stannard's brigades were added on the morning of the 2d July, there were 82,208 officers and men in the infantry available for duty in the line of battle. This should satisfy him that his other estimates, founded on testimony similar to that adduced on this point, in regard to the force available to oppose an advance by us after the close of the fight on the 1st, are fallacious. By reference to the return of July the 10th, he will find that the Eleventh corps had still 6,895 officers and men for duty, and the First corps 4,792, after the losses not only of the first day, but also of the second and third, though there had been no additions to either corps after the battle, and Stannard's brigade, which joined the First corps on the second day, had departed because of the expiration of its term of service.

I will not continue the discussion with him of the propriety and

feasibility of an attempt to take possession of the heights at the close of the first day's fight. He admits that "of course, after the arrival of his chief, all responsibility was taken from Ewell in not ordering the troops forward—it was assumed by and is to be placed on General Lee." That is what I have always thought, and the statement of Colonel Taylor that "General Lee witnessed the flight of the Federals through Gettysburg and up the hills beyond;" of General Heth, that he applied for and obtained permission from General Lee to attack while Rodes was engaged; and of General Pendleton, that General Lee arrived on the field about two P. M., and gave instructions for posting some artillery so as to enfilade the enemy's line before it began to fall back, settles the question of his presence beyond all dispute. Ewell is therefore relieved from the responsibility for not ordering a general advance, and it rests on General Lee, according to General Fitz. Lee's own admission. General Lee's fame can stand the ordeal of all the criticisms of all those who were not present, and can therefore form no just estimate of the obstacles to an advance on our part that presented themselves on the occasion. The order to Ewell contemplated the use of only his own troops then at hand, to carry the hill, if he found it practicable without bringing on a general engagement. He was on the low ground at the foot of the hill, and could neither see the enemy nor form any estimate of his strength, while General Lee had a much better view from Seminary ridge, and he ordered none of Hill's troops to advance. Ewell could not do so when the Commanding-General was present. If he had gone forward with his less than 8,000 men that were available before the arrival of Johnson, he could not "have shattered the Twelfth corps—possibly portions of two others;" and as our position was perfectly in view from Cemetery hill, and all our movements could be seen, when we commenced ascending that hill, Buford with his 2,500 cavalry might have swept around the town on our right, released the several thousand prisoners we had taken, and destroyed our trains, as there would have been nothing in our rear to oppose him.

When Johnson arrived, which was after six P. M., the opportunity for taking the heights without a desperate and uncertain struggle had passed, as General Hancock's statement makes very apparent.

Those who are still disposed to carp at the operations of the first day, can turn their batteries on General Lee, if they think proper; but it is very easy to imagine what would be his reply if he were alive.

J. A. EARLY.

Roster of Infantry, A. N. V., at Battle of Gettysburg, by General J. A. Early.

The Infantry of the Army of Northern Virginia as it was reorganized just before the commencement of the Pennsylvania campaign of 1863 and as it remained up to the 1st of May, 1864.

FIRST CORPS.

Lieutenant-General JAMES LONGSTREET, with rank from 9th October, 1862.

MCLAWS' DIVISION—Major-General LAFAYETTE MCLAWS—May 23d, 1862 (date of rank).

<i>Kershaw's Brigade.</i>		<i>Semmes' Brigade.</i>		<i>Barkdale's Brigade.</i>		<i>Wofford's Brigade.</i>	
Brigadier-General J. B. Kershaw.	Brigadier-General P. J. Semmes.	Brigadier-General Wm. Barkdale.	Brigadier-General W. T. Wofford.	Brigadier-General Wm. Barkdale.	Brigadier-General W. T. Wofford.	Brigadier-General W. T. Wofford.	Brigadier-General W. T. Wofford.
February 13, 1862.	March 11, 1862.	August 12, 1862.	January 17, 1863.	August 12, 1862.	January 17, 1863.	January 17, 1863.	January 17, 1863.
2d South Carolina Regiment.	10th Georgia Regiment.	18th Mississippi Regiment.	18th Georgia Regiment.	18th Mississippi Regiment.	18th Georgia Regiment.	18th Georgia Regiment.	18th Georgia Regiment.
7th " "	50th " "	17th " "	17th " "	17th " "	17th " "	17th " "	17th " "
8th " "	51st " "	18th " "	18th " "	18th " "	18th " "	18th " "	18th " "
10th " "	52d " "	21st " "	21st " "	21st " "	21st " "	21st " "	21st " "
3d Battalion.	Afterwards Brig-General Goode	Afterwards Humphreys.	Phillips' Georgia Legion.	Afterwards Humphreys.	Phillips' Georgia Legion.	Phillips' Georgia Legion.	Phillips' Georgia Legion.
	Bryan.		Cobb's		Cobb's	Cobb's	Cobb's

PICKETT'S DIVISION—Major-General GEORGE E. PICKETT—October 10th, 1862 (date of rank).

<i>Garnett's Brigade.</i>		<i>Armistead's Brigade.</i>		<i>Kemper's Brigade.</i>		<i>Jenkins' Brigade.</i>		<i>Corse's Brigade.</i>	
Brigadier-General R. B. Garnett.	Brigadier-General L. A. Armistead.	Brigadier-General J. L. Kemper.	Brigadier-General M. Jenkins.	Brigadier-General M. D. Corse.	Brigadier-General M. D. Corse.	Brigadier-General M. D. Corse.	Brigadier-General M. D. Corse.	Brigadier-General M. D. Corse.	Brigadier-General M. D. Corse.
November 14, 1861.	April 1st, 1862.	June 3, 1862.	July 22, 1862.	November 1, 1862.	November 1, 1862.	November 1, 1862.	November 1, 1862.	November 1, 1862.	November 1, 1862.
8th Virginia Regiment.	9th Virginia Regiment.	1st Virginia Regiment.	1st South Carolina Reg't.	1st South Carolina Reg't.	1st South Carolina Reg't.	1st South Carolina Reg't.	1st South Carolina Reg't.	1st South Carolina Reg't.	1st South Carolina Reg't.
18th " "	14th " "	3d " "	5th " "	5th " "	5th " "	5th " "	5th " "	5th " "	5th " "
20th " "	15th " "	4th " "	6th " "	6th " "	6th " "	6th " "	6th " "	6th " "	6th " "
22nd " "	16th " "	5th " "	7th " "	7th " "	7th " "	7th " "	7th " "	7th " "	7th " "
24th " "	17th " "	6th " "	8th " "	8th " "	8th " "	8th " "	8th " "	8th " "	8th " "
26th " "	18th " "	7th " "	9th " "	9th " "	9th " "	9th " "	9th " "	9th " "	9th " "
Afterwards Brigadier-General	Afterwards Brig-General	Afterwards Brig-General	Afterwards Brig-General	Afterwards Brig-General	Afterwards Brig-General	Afterwards Brig-General	Afterwards Brig-General	Afterwards Brig-General	Afterwards Brig-General
Eppa Hunton.	Seth M. Barton.	Wm. R. Terry.	Not at Gettysburg. Transferred to Hood's division October, 1863.	Not at Gettysburg. Transferred to Hood's division October, 1863.	Not at Gettysburg. Transferred to Hood's division October, 1863.	Not at Gettysburg. Transferred to Hood's division October, 1863.	Not at Gettysburg. Transferred to Hood's division October, 1863.	Not at Gettysburg. Transferred to Hood's division October, 1863.	Not at Gettysburg. Transferred to Hood's division October, 1863.

HOOD'S DIVISION—Major-General JOHN B. HOOD—10th October, 1862—Afterwards Major-General CHARLES W. FIELD—February 12, 1864.

<i>Law's Brigade.</i>		<i>Anderson's Brigade.</i>		<i>Robertson's Brigade.</i>		<i>Benning's Brigade.</i>	
Brigadier-General E. M. Law.	Brigadier-General S. T. Anderson.	Brigadier-General J. B. Robertson.	Brigadier-General H. L. Benning.	Brigadier-General J. B. Robertson.	Brigadier-General H. L. Benning.	Brigadier-General H. L. Benning.	Brigadier-General H. L. Benning.
October 3d, 1862.	November 1st, 1862.	November 1st, 1862.	January 17, 1863.	November 1st, 1862.	January 17, 1863.	January 17, 1863.	January 17, 1863.
4th Alabama Regiment.	7th Georgia Regiment.	1st Texas Regiment.	2d Georgia Regiment.	1st Texas Regiment.	2d Georgia Regiment.	2d Georgia Regiment.	2d Georgia Regiment.
18th " "	8th " "	4th " "	18th " "	4th " "	18th " "	18th " "	18th " "
44th " "	9th " "	5th " "	17th " "	5th " "	17th " "	17th " "	17th " "
47th " "	10th " "	6th " "	16th " "	6th " "	16th " "	16th " "	16th " "
48th " "	Battalion.	3d Arkansas	30th " "	3d Arkansas	30th " "	30th " "	30th " "

Lieutenant-General R. S. EWELL, with rank from May 23d, 1863.

EARLY'S DIVISION—Major-General JUBAL A. EARLY—January 17th, 1863 (date of rank).

<i>Hayes' Brigade.</i> Brigadier-General Harry T. Hays. July 25, 1862. 6th Louisiana Regiment. 20th " " 54th " " 55th " " 56th " " 57th " " 58th " " 59th " " 60th "	<i>Hoke's Brigade.</i> Brigadier-General Robert F. Hoke. January 17, 1863. 6th North Carolina Regiment. 21st " " 54th " " 55th " " 56th " " 57th " " 58th " " 59th " " 60th " 1st Battalion. Col. Avery in command at Gettysburg.	<i>Smith's Brigade.</i> Brigadier-General Wm. Smith. January 31st, 1863. 13th Virginia Regiment.* 31st " " 49th " " 50th " " 51st " " 52nd " " 53rd " " 54th " " 55th " " 56th " " 57th " " 58th " " 59th " " 60th " " 61st " " Afterwards Brigadier-General John Pegram.	<i>Gordon's Brigade.</i> Brigadier-General John B. Gordon. May 7th, 1863. 13th Georgia Regiment. 26th " " 31st " " 32nd " " 33rd " " 34th " " 35th " " 36th " " 37th " " 38th " " 39th " " 40th " " 41st " " 42nd " " 43rd " " 44th " " 45th " " 46th " " 47th " " 48th " " 49th " " 50th " " 51st " " 52nd " " 53rd " " 54th " " 55th " " 56th " " 57th " " 58th " " 59th " " 60th " " 61st " "
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JOHNSON'S DIVISION—Major-General EDWARD JOHNSON—February 23d, 1863 (date of rank).

<i>Steuart's Brigade.</i> Brig.-General George H. Steuart. March 6th, 1862. 10th Virginia Regiment. 24th " " 24th " " 21st North Carolina Regiment. 21st " " 1st Maryland Battalion.	<i>Nichols's Brigade.</i> Brig.-General Francis T. Nichols. October 14th, 1862. 1st Louisiana Regiment. 24th " " 10th " " 10th " " 13th " " 15th " " Colonel in command at Geutysburg. Afterwards Brigadier-General L. A. Stafford.	<i>Stonewall Brigade.</i> Brigadier-General A. A. Walker. May 18th, 1863. 2d Virginia Regiment. 43th " " 51th " " 57th " " 35th " "	<i>Jones's Brigade.</i> Brigadier-General J. M. Jones. May 18th, 1863. 21st Virginia Regiment. 29th " " 43th " " 45th " " 60th " "
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RODES' DIVISION—Major-General ROBERT E. RODES—May 2d, 1863 (date of rank).

<i>Daniels' Brigade.</i>	<i>Inverness' Brigade.</i>	<i>Doles' Brigade.</i>	<i>Ramseur's Brigade.</i>	<i>Rodes' Brigade.</i>
Brig.-General Junius Daniel,	Brigadier-General A. Iverson,	Brigadier-General G. Doles,	Brig.-General S. D. Ramseur,	Colonel E. A. O'Neal,
September 1st, 1862.	November 1st, 1862.	November 1st, 1862.	November 1st, 1862.	2d Alabama Regiment,
12th " "	53th North Carolina Regiment,	4th Georgia Regiment,	2d North Carolina Regiment,	5th " "
3d " "	12th " "	12th " "	4th " "	6th " "
3d " "	20th " "	21st " "	14th " "	12th " "
3d " "	23d " "	44th " "	30th " "	22d " "
Battalion.	Brigadier-General R. D. Johnston,			Afterwards Brigadier-General C. A. Battle,

THIRD CORPS.

Lieutenant-General A. P. HILL, May 24th, 1863 (date of rank).

ANDERSON'S DIVISION—Major-General R. H. ANDERSON—July 14th, 1863 (date of rank).

Wilson's Brigade.	Malone's Brigade.	Wright's Brigade.	Perry's Brigade.	Peep's Brigade.
Brig.-General C. M. Wilcox.	Brig.-General W. Malone.	Brig.-General A. R. Wright.	Brig.-General E. M. Perry.	Brig.-General C. Posey.
October 21st, 1861.	November 15, 1861.	June 3d, 1862.	August 28th, 1862.	November 1, 1862.
8th Alabama Regiment.	6th Virginia Regiment.	3d Georgia Regiment.	2d Florida Regiment.	12th Mississippi Regiment.
9th " "	12th " "	2d " "	5th " "	16th " "
10th " "	16th " "	48th " "	8th " "	19th " "
11th " "	41st " "	2d Battalion.	" "	48th " "
14th " "	61st " "	" "	" "	Afterwards Brigadier-General N. H. Harris.

HETH'S DIVISION—Major-General HENRY HETH—May 24th, 1863 (date of rank).

Pettigrew's Brigade.	Archer's Brigade.	Davis' Brigade.	Cooke's Brigade.	Heth's Brigade.
Brig.-General J. Pettigrew.	Brig.-General J. Archer.	Brig.-General R. Davis.	Brig.-General J. Cooke.	Col. J. M. McCambrath.
Feb. 26, 1862.	March 31, 1862.	March 15th, 1862.	November 1st, 1862.	40th Virginia Regiment.
11th N. Carolina Regiment.	1st Tennessee Regiment.	2d Mississippi Regiment.	15th N. Carolina Regiment.	41th " "
26th " "	7th " "	11th " "	27th " "	53th " "
42d " "	14th " "	26th " "	46th " "	22d Battalion.
41th " "	13th Alabama Battalion.	42d " "	48th " "	After Gettysburg consolidated with Archer's brigade, under Brigadier-General H. H. Walker.
52d " "	8th " "	55th N. Carolina 1st Confederate Battalion.	Not at Gettysburg.	
Afterwards Brigadier-General W. W. Kirkland.	Afterwards Brigadier-General H. H. Walker.			

PENDER'S DIVISION—Major-General W. D. PENDER—May 27th, 1863 (date of rank).—Afterwards Major-General C. M. WILCOX, August 3d, 1863.

Lane's Brigade.	Thomas's Brigade.	McGowan's Brigade.	Scates' Brigade.
Brigadier-General James H. Lane.	Brigadier-General E. L. Thomas.	Brigadier-General S. McGowan.	Brigadier-General A. M. Scates.
November 1st, 1862.	November 1st, 1862.	January 17th, 1863.	June 13th, 1863.
7th North Carolina Regiment.	14th Georgia Regiment.	1st South Carolina Regiment.	13th North Carolina Regiment.
15th " "	20th " "	12th " "	14th " "
29th " "	42th " "	13th " "	22d " "
33d " "	40th " "	14th " "	34th " "
37th " "	" "	1st Rifles.	38th " "

NOTES TO PRECEDING ROSTER.

* Regiments thus designated, were counted in the return for May 31st, 1863, but were not at Gettysburg, to wit: the five regiments in Corse's brigade and three in my division.

† Regiments thus designated were not counted in the return for May 31st, but were at Gettysburg, to wit: four in Pettigrew's brigade; the Twenty-fifth and Thirty-first Virginia; and the Forty-second Mississippi and Fifty-fifth North Carolina in Davis' brigade.

‡ Regiments thus designated were neither counted in the return of May 31, nor at Gettysburg, to wit: the five in Jenkins' brigade, four in Cooke's brigade, and one in Pettigrew's, and one regiment and the First Confederate battalion in Davis' brigade.

§ This battalion, First North Carolina, containing two companies, was detached before the 20th of June, and assigned to duty as a provost guard at corps headquarters.

¶ There were two First South Carolina regiments, one called volunteers and the other regulars, and there was a First South Carolina rifles. The First South Carolina regiment in this brigade was probably the regulars. The First Virginia battalion, under Major Bridgeford, was a provost guard at army headquarters.

Jenkins' brigade was transferred from Pickett's to Hood's division in October, 1863. Cooke's brigade did not join Heth's division until after the return from Pennsylvania. The Twenty-sixth Mississippi regiment did not join Davis' brigade until after the return from Pennsylvania.

The Forty-second North Carolina regiment was not with Pettigrew's brigade at Gettysburg, but was left in Virginia.

Rank of Lieutenant-Generals—

- 1st. J. LONGSTREET.
- 2d. R. S. EWELL.
- 3d. A. P. HILL.

Rank of Major-Generals—

- 1st. LAFAYETTE McLAWS.
- 2d. R. H. ANDERSON.
- 3d. G. E. PICKETT.
- 4th. JOHN B. HOOD. Promoted.
- 5th. J. A. EARLY.
- 6th. EDWARD JOHNSON.
- 7th. R. E. RODES.
- 8th. HENRY HETH.
- 9th. W. D. PENDER. Died from wounds.
- 10th. C. M. WILCOX. Appointed vice Pender.
- 11th. C. W. FIELD. Appointed vice Hood.

General Van Dorn's Report of the Elkhorn Campaign.

[We have been very fortunate in securing recently a copy of the head-quarter book of General Earl Van Dorn, containing the orders, telegrams, letters, &c., issued from his headquarters from January 23d, 1862, to June 22d, 1862. Many of these will be read with interest as from time to time we shall be able to print them; but we are especially gratified at being able to present the following report of the Elkhorn campaign, which does not appear in the volumes of Confederate reports, and which, so far as we know, has never been in print in any form.]

HEADQUARTERS TRANS-MISSISSIPPI DISTRICT,
JACKSONPORT, ARK., March 27, 1862.

General BRAXTON BRAGG :

General—I have the honor to report that while at Pocahontas I received dispatches on the 22d February, informing me that General Price had rapidly fallen back from Springfield before a superior force of the enemy, and was endeavoring to form a junction with the division of General McCulloch in Boston mountains. For reasons which seemed to me imperative, I resolved to go in person and take command of the combined forces of Price and McCulloch. I reached their headquarters on the 3d of March, and being satisfied that the enemy, who had halted on Sugar creek, fifty-five miles distant, was only awaiting large reinforcements before he would advance, I resolved to attack him at once. Accordingly, I sent for General Pike to join me near Elm Springs with the forces under his command, and on the morning of the 4th of March moved with the divisions of Price and McCulloch, by way of Fayetteville and Bentonville, to attack the enemy's main camp on Sugar creek. The whole force under my command was about sixteen thousand men.

On the 6th we left Elm Spring for Bentonville, and from prisoners captured by our scouting parties on the 5th I became convinced that up to that time no suspicion was entertained of our advance, and that there were strong hopes of our effecting a complete surprise, and attacking the enemy before the large detachments encamped at the various points in the surrounding country could rejoin the main body. I therefore endeavored to reach Bentonville, eleven miles distant, by a rapid march, but the troops moved so very slowly that it was 11 A. M. before the head of the leading division (Price's) reached the village, and we had the mortification to see Siegel's division, seven thousand strong, leaving it as we

entered. Had we been one hour sooner, we should have cut him off with his whole force, and certainly have beaten the enemy next day.

We followed him, our advance skirmishing with his rear guard, which was admirably handled, until we had gained a point on Sugar creek about seven miles beyond Bentonville and within one or two miles of the strongly entrenched camp of the enemy.

In conference with Generals McCulloch and McIntosh, who had an accurate knowledge of this locality, I had ascertained that by making a detour of eight miles, I could reach the Telegraph road, leading from Springfield to Fayetteville, and be immediately in rear of the enemy and his entrenchments.

I had resolved to adopt this route, and therefore halted the head of my column near the point where the road by which I proposed to move diverges, threw out my pickets, and bivouacked as if for the night; but soon after dark I marched again, moving with Price's division in advance, and taking the road by which I hoped before daylight to reach the rear of the enemy.

Some obstructions, which he had hastily thrown in the way, so impeded our march, that we did not gain the Telegraph road until near 10 o'clock A. M. of the 7th.

From prisoners with forage wagons whom our cavalry pickets brought in, we were assured that we were not expected in that quarter, and that the promise was fair for a complete surprise.

I at once made dispositions for attack, and directing General Price to move forward cautiously, soon drew the fire of a few skirmishers, who were rapidly reinforced, so that before 11 o'clock we were fairly engaged, the enemy holding very good positions and maintaining a heavy fire of artillery and small arms upon the constantly advancing columns which were being pressed upon him.

I had directed General McCulloch to attack with his forces the enemy's left, and before 2 o'clock it was evident that if his division could advance, or even maintain its ground, I could at once throw forward Price's left, advance his whole line, and end the battle. I sent him a dispatch to this effect, but it was never received by him; before it was penned, his brave spirit had winged its flight, and one of the most gallant leaders of the Confederacy had fought his last battle.

About 3 P. M. I received by aid-de-camp the information that Generals McCulloch and McIntosh and Colonel Hebert were killed, and that the division was without any head. I nevertheless pressed

forward with the attack, and at sunset the enemy was flying before our victorious troops at every point in our front, and when night fell, we had driven him entirely from the field of battle. Our troops slept upon their arms nearly a mile beyond the point at which he made his last stand, and my headquarters for the night were at the Elkhorn tavern. We had taken during the day seven cannon and about two hundred prisoners.

In the course of the night I ascertained that the ammunition was almost exhausted, and that the officer in charge of the ordnance supplies could not find his wagons, which, with the subsistence train, had been sent to Bentonville. Most of the troops had been without any food since the morning of the 6th, and the artillery horses were beaten out. It was therefore with no little anxiety that I awaited the dawn of day. When it came, it revealed to me the enemy in a new and strong position offering battle. I made my dispositions at once to accept the gage, and by 7 o'clock the cannonading was as heavy as that of the previous day. On the side of the enemy the fire was much better sustained; for being freed from the attack of my right wing, he could now concentrate his whole artillery force. Finding that my right wing was much disorganized, and that the batteries were one after the other retiring from the field with every shot expended, I resolved to withdraw the army, and at once placed the ambulances with all of the wounded they would bear upon the Huntsville road, and a portion of McCulloch's division, which had joined me during the night, in position to follow, while I so disposed of my remaining forces as best to deceive the enemy as to my intention, and to hold him in check while executing it.

About 10 o'clock I gave the order for the column to march, and soon afterwards for the troops engaged to fall back and cover the rear of the army. This was done very steadily—no attempt was made by the enemy to follow us, and we encamped about 3 P. M. about ten miles from the field of battle. Some demonstrations were made by his cavalry upon my baggage train and the batteries of artillery which returned by different routes from that taken by the army, but they were instantly checked, and, thanks to the skill and courage of Colonel Stone and Major Wade, all of the baggage and artillery joined the army in safety.

So far as I can ascertain, our losses amount to about six hundred killed and wounded and two hundred prisoners, and one cannon which, having become disabled, I ordered to be thrown into a ravine.

The best information I can procure of the enemy's loss, places his killed at more than seven hundred, with at least an equal number of wounded. We captured about three hundred prisoners, so that his total loss is near about two thousand. We brought away four cannon and ten baggage wagons, and we burnt upon the field three cannon taken by McIntosh in his brilliant charge; the horses having been killed, these guns could not be brought away.

The force with which I went into action was less than 14,000 men; that of the enemy is variously estimated at from 17,000 to 24,000.

During the whole of this engagement I was with the Missouri division under Price, and I have never seen better fighters than those Missouri troops, or more gallant leaders than General Price and his officers. From the first to the last shot they continually pushed on and never yielded an inch they had won, and when at last they received the order to fall back, they retired steadily and with cheers. General Price received a severe wound early in the action, but would neither retire from the field nor cease to expose himself to danger.

No successes can repair the loss of the gallant dead who fell on this well-fought field. McCulloch was the first to fall. I had found him, in the frequent conferences I had with him, a sagacious, prudent counsellor, and a bolder soldier never died for his country.

McIntosh had been very much distinguished all through the operations which have taken place in this region; and during my advance from Boston mountain I placed him in command of the cavalry brigade and in charge of the pickets. He was alert, daring and devoted to his duty. His kindness of disposition with his reckless bravery had attached the troops strongly to him; so that after McCulloch fell, had he remained to lead them, all would have been well with my right wing. But after leading a brilliant charge of cavalry and carrying the enemy's battery, he rushed into the thick of the fight again at the head of his old regiment, and was shot through the heart. The value of these two officers was best proven by the effect of their fall upon the troops. So long as brave deeds are admired by our people, the names of McCulloch and McIntosh will be remembered and loved.

General Slack, after gallantly maintaining a long continued and successful attack, was shot through the body; but I hope his distinguished services will be restored to his country.

A noble boy, Churchill Clarke, commanded a battery of artillery,

and during the fierce artillery actions of the 7th and 8th, was conspicuous for the daring and skill which he exhibited. He fell at the very close of the action. Colonel Rives fell mortally wounded about the same time, and was a great loss to us. On a field where were many gallant gentlemen, I remember him as one of the most energetic and devoted of them all.

To Colonel Henry Little my especial thanks are due for the coolness, skill and devotion with which for two days he and his gallant brigade bore the brunt of the battle. Colonel Burbridge, Colonel Rosser, Colonel Gates, Major Souther, Major Wade, Captain McDonald and Captain Johanneberg are some of those who attracted my especial attention by their distinguished conduct.

In McCulloch's division, the Louisiana regiment, under Colonel Louis Hebert, and the Arkansas regiment, under Colonel Macrae, are especially mentioned for their good conduct. Major Montgomery, Captain Bradfute, Lieutenants Lomax, Kimmel, Dillon and Frank Armstrong, A. A. G., were ever active and soldierly. After their services were no longer required with their own divisions, they joined my staff, and I am much indebted to them for the efficient aid they gave me during the engagement of the 8th. They are meritorious officers, whose value is lost to the service by their not receiving rank more accordant with their merit and experience than they now hold.

Being without my proper staff, I was much gratified by the offer of Colonel Shands and Captain Barrett, of the Missouri army, of their services as aids. They were of very great assistance to me by the courage and intelligence with which they bore my orders; also, Colonel Lewis, of Missouri.

None of the gentlemen of my personal staff, with the exception of Colonel Dabney H. Maury, A. A. G., and Lieutenant C. Sullivane, my Aid-de-Camp, accompanied me from Jacksonport, the others having left on special duty. Colonel Maury was of invaluable service to me, both in preparing for and during the battle. Here, as on other battle fields where I have served with him, he proved to be a zealous patriot, and true soldier, cool and calm under all circumstances, he was always ready either with his sword or his pen. His services and Lieutenant Sullivane's are distinguished. The latter had his horse killed under him whilst leading a charge, the order for which he had delivered.

You will perceive from this report, General, that though I did not, as I hoped, capture or destroy the enemy's army in Western

Arkansas, I have inflicted upon it a heavy blow, and compelled him to fall back into Missouri. This he did on the 16th instant.

For further details concerning the action, and for more particular notices of the troops engaged, I respectfully refer you to the reports of the subordinate officers, which accompany this report.

Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

EARL VAN DORN, *Major-General.*

The Battle of Mobile Bay. By Commodore Foxhall A. Parker, U. S. N.
Boston: A. Williams & Co.

A Review by General D. H. Maury.

This book is an interesting and valuable addition to the history of the times to which it relates.

The narrative is admirably composed, so that the details, which are given with great accuracy, run smoothly along the course of the story, adding graphic effect to it.

The charm of the book is that having been written by a prominent Federal actor in the great battle, it accords full justice to the Confederates who opposed him with such desperate valor.

No such complete account of the famous ram Tennessee has ever yet been given to the public; and in perusing Commodore Parker's history of her we feel that but for the untoward accidents by which she lost so much propelling power and the control of her steering gear, she would alone and single-handed have driven Farragut and his whole fleet out of Mobile bay.

While this little book will be of deep and especial interest to naval men of the late Confederate and Federal services, it will please all intelligent readers.

It is gotten up in elegant style. The type and paper are good and the binding is elegant.

In the appendix are given several reports of commanders of both sides, which as they relate to the most remarkable conflict of this century, and one about which very little is known to most of our readers, we will reproduce at some early day.

There is something sublime in the devoted courage of our Old Admiral Buchanan, who having gallantly opposed the entrance of the fleet until all his little gunboats were sunk or captured, dashed like a lion at bay from his vantage ground under the guns of Fort Morgan to encounter with the Tennessee alone the whole of Farragut's formidable flotilla. The odds were fearful, yet the skill and daring of Buchanan made the issue hang doubtful for more than an hour. To attack and sink Farragut's ship was the constant purpose of Buchanan. Other captains encountered him on his way with ships as formidable as the Hartford, but Farragut was in the Hartford—to sink him was to win the battle—and so he drove all other comers from his path, and pressed relentlessly on to the grand object of attack. Farragut himself, after all was over, con-

fessed that he was fully conscious of the doubtful issue of the battle with Buchanan.

Ah! had that luckless rudder chain not have jammed, Buchanan, not Farragut, might have been the great naval hero of the war.

The extreme difficulties we had to encounter in building such a ship as the Tennessee are well narrated by Commodore Parker, and leave little cause for wonder or complaint that so many imperfections existed in her construction.

The engines were taken from a Mississippi steamer on the Yazoo river, and hauled several hundreds of miles across the country to the Tombigbee river, where the ship was being built of timbers fresh cut from the neighboring forests, to be covered at Mobile with iron drawn for the purpose out of the mines of Alabama.

Every timber, every spike and rivet, in fact every component part of the ship was made in the Confederacy, and her formidable battery of Brooke guns, with their fixed ammunition, powder, fuses and projectiles, were invented and manufactured by Confederates.

When at last the ship was ironed, her draught was found to be too great by seven feet!

She drew fifteen feet, and there was scarce eight feet of water on the bars over which she must pass to reach her fighting ground in lower Mobile bay. There were fortunately two great caissons just constructed at Mobile by order of the General commanding the forces there, which Admiral Buchanan borrowed in this emergency to float the Tennessee over the bars. These caissons were sixty feet by sixty by twelve. The Admiral cut them in two, lashed with chains two of them under either side of the Tennessee, and found that after having pumped them out the ship was lifted till she drew but little over seven feet!

She was then towed up the Mobile river and down the Spanish river, through the obstructions and down into deep water in the lower bay—a distance of thirty miles in all—where her battery was put aboard, and she was turned loose in full view of Farragut's fleet. But after all was done for her that could be done, and she was offering battle to the enemy, her engines could drive her but little over five knots an hour!

Moreover, it had been discovered by her captain, when too late to be effectually remedied, that her steering gear was exposed. Her rudder chains ran in an uncovered groove upon her after-deck, instead of being secured under the iron plating of the deck itself. An effort was made to remedy this defect by covering the groove in

which the chains ran with a sheet of iron one inch thick. During the action, an eleven-inch shot fell upon this thin iron covering and jammed it down upon the rudder chains, so that the ship from that moment lay like a log.

She could not move at all. Her guns could not be brought to bear, and the enemy's ships took positions such that out of range themselves they could pound the Tennessee to pieces. Her rudder chains jammed, three of her port shutters jammed, her smoke-stack shot away, and finally her brave old Admiral shot down, amidst more than thirty of his dead and wounded crew, the surrender of the Tennessee was no less glorious to the Confederates than to the Federals who overwhelmed her.

Editorial Paragraphs.

In entering upon our sixth volume we feel like extending our cordial congratulations to the Society on the success which has attended our publication venture.

Beginning to publish our Monthly on the 1st of January, 1876, we have had to contend against "the hard times," and other difficulties under which many similar enterprises have failed. Our *Papers* have, however, steadily grown in popular favor until we consider them an assured success. As to their value and importance (we may speak freely on this point since the Secretary has troubled the reader with very little of his own production, and has simply acted as *compiler*), we have every day cumulative evidence that our publications are recognized as of the *highest authority*, and are sought after by those who would know the truth of the "War between the States."

Our subscription list has reached a number which, if we can keep it at that figure, will easily meet our current expenses year by year.

But we have not a tenth of the subscribers we *ought* to have, not half the number we would have in a very short time if our friends generally would exert themselves to extend our circulation.

And we suggest that it would be an important service to introduce a full set of our volumes into college, Y. M. C. A. and other public libraries.

We again pledge ourselves to maintain the high character of our publications, and to increase from time to time their interest and value.

OUR RULE AGAINST COPYING ARTICLES that have already been published needs to be restated, and insisted upon.

We frequently receive articles that have been printed in some newspaper, or in some other form, with the request that we "publish at once" in our *Papers*. Now, we are always glad to get such articles, and to preserve them carefully in our archives, and *sometimes* there may be imperative reasons for republishing them. But as a rule we have on hand so many *original MSS.* that we cannot undertake to *copy* what has appeared elsewhere. Yet we hope our friends will continue to send us newspapers, pamphlets, and all other forms of printed matter bearing on our history. Even if we cannot reprint it we will carefully preserve for the use of the historian, and will at any time give the readiest access to it to any one desiring to know the truth.

OPERATIONS IN THE WEST AND SOUTHWEST will now claim a good share of our attention, and we hope to be able to publish a series of papers on all of the most important battles of those armies. We are now arranging for such a series, and we beg the help of our friends in either sending us papers themselves, or in informing us to whom we may write for such papers. If we fail to publish a full discussion of all of the great battles of the West, it will be only because of the failure of the gallant men who made those fields illustrious to furnish us the material.

GENERAL GEO. D. JOHNSTON, GENERAL AGENT of our Society, whose work in Nashville, Memphis, Jackson and Clarksville, Tennessee, was so successful, expects to begin operations in Louisville and other parts of Kentucky in a few days.

A gallant soldier, an accomplished gentleman and a graceful speaker, General Johnston needs no introduction from us; and yet the friends of our good cause can greatly lighten his labors, and help us if they will give him their hearty co-operation.

GENERAL J. C. BROWN, EX-GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE, has kindly consented to deliver an address in the interest of our Society at the Greenbrier White Sulphur Springs about the 7th of August (the exact day will be announced in due season), and it is hoped that many of the members and friends of the Society will find it convenient to attend.

ANONYMOUS COMMUNICATIONS, it would seem useless to say, never receive consideration at our office; and our rule is never to publish anything without a responsible name attached. All requests to publish papers to which the authors, from whatever cause, are not willing to attach their names, are useless, as the name must invariably appear.

Book Notices.

Memoir of William Francis Bartlett. By Francis Winthrop Palfrey. Boston: Houghton, Osgood & Co.

We have received from the publishers, through J. W. Randolph & English, Richmond, a copy of this beautifully gotten up book.

It is the biography of a young man of fine talents and culture who entered the Federal army as captain in the Twentieth Massachusetts regiment and rose to the rank of brigadier-general; who lost his leg and was otherwise wounded in the service; whose whole soul was in the cause he espoused, but who seems to have fully recognized that *the war closed when the Confederate armies surrendered*, and to have devoted himself earnestly to bringing about *real peace* between the North and the South.

The book is well written, and the extracts from his diary and private letters give freshness to the narrative. If we were disposed to criticise the fact that some bitter and (as we hold) very unjust expressions towards the South in his army letters are allowed to mar the spirit of the narrative, we would be reminded that these indicate the true feelings of the times, and that these are atoned for by the very different spirit in which he wrote and spoke after the close of the war. E. g., if he called us in '61 "traitors" who "viper-like" had fired on the flag which protected us, he said in a public speech at Lexington, Massachusetts, on the 19th of April, 1875: "As an American, I am as proud of the men who charged so bravely with Pickett's division on our lines at Gettysburg, as I am of the men who so bravely met and repulsed them there. Men cannot always choose the right cause; but when, having chosen that which conscience dictates, they are ready to die for it, if

they justify not their cause, they at least ennoble themselves. And the men who, for conscience' sake, fought against their government at Gettysburg, ought easily to be forgiven by the sons of men who, for conscience' sake, fought against their government at Lexington and Bunker Hill."

A Sketch of the Life of Randolph Fairfax. By Reverend Phillip Slaughter, D. D.

We are indebted to the author (through Woodhouse & Parham) for this beautiful story of a noble life. It was published during the war in tract form, and it was our privilege to circulate a number of copies of it among our soldiers. This is a new edition, beautifully gotten up, and with some valuable additions. Dr. Slaughter has done a valuable service in preserving this story of the life of a bright, noble, educated young man of high social position, illustrious ancestry and humble piety, who marched forth at his country's call and freely gave his brave young life for the land he loved so well. There could be no higher tribute to this gifted young man than the following letter:

CAMP NEAR FREDERICKSBURG,
December 28th, 1862.

My Dear Doctor—I have grieved most deeply at the death of your noble son. I have watched his conduct since the commencement of the war, and have pointed with pride to the patriotism, self-denial and manliness of character he has exhibited. I had hoped that an opportunity would have occurred for the promotion he deserved; not that it would have elevated him, but have shown that his devotion to duty was appreciated by his country. Such an opportunity would undoubtedly have occurred; but he has been translated to a better world, for which his purity and his piety have eminently fitted him. You do not require to be told how great his gain. It is the living for whom I sorrow. I beg you will offer to Mrs. Fairfax and your daughters my heart-felt sympathy, for I know the depth of their grief. That God may give you and them strength to bear this great affliction, is the earnest prayer of your early friend

R. E. LEE.

Life of Albert Sidney Johnston. By his son, Colonel Wm. Preston Johnston. D. Appleton & Co.

This book is announced in our advertising columns as now ready, and we have had the privilege of reading some of the advanced sheets.

Reserving a full review until we shall have an opportunity of reading the whole book, we will only say now that it is the story of the life of a noble man whose career shed lustre on the American name—that the narrative displays that delicacy of feeling, chaste diction and vigorous style that we expected from the accomplished author, and that the book will be a most valuable contribution to our history and one that will be widely read and appreciated.